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We examine how important social and technical choices become part of the 
history of a computer-based information system (CB/SJ and embedded in the social 
structure which supports its development and use. These elements of a CBIS can be 
organized in specific ways to enhance its usability and performance. Paradoxically, 
they can also constrain future implementations and post-implementations. 
We argue that CBIS developed from complex, interdependent social and technical 
choices should be conceptualized in terms of their institutional characteristics, as 
well as their information-processing characteristics. The social system which sup-
ports the development and operation of a CB/Sis one major element whose institu-
tional characteristics can effectively support routine activities while impeding 
substantial innovation. Characterizing CB/Sas institutions is important for several 
reasons: {l) the usability of CB/S is more critical than the abstract information-
processing capabilities of the underlying technology; (2) CBIS that are well-used and 
have stable social structures are more difficult to replace than those with less 
developed social structures and fewer participants; (3) CBIS vary from one social 
setting to another according to the ways in which they are organized and embedded 
in organized social systems. These ideas are illustrated with the case study of a failed 
attempt to convert a complex inventory control system in a medium-sized manufac-
turing firm. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many information systems analysts and organizational theorists focus on the 
information-processing capabilities of computer-based information systems (CBIS) 
when analyzing their benefits and limitations. They examine how the information-
processing features of a CBIS makes them into special instruments for enhancing 
productivity, increasing efficiency, tightening control over resources or workers, and 
improving strategic advantage (1-13]. The literature about what computerization 
can do for people and organizations is permeated with positive images of interesting 
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social changes which can be catalyzed by CBIS. In this paper we examine why these 
changes are sometimes difficult to bring about. 
The analyses which place the instrumental value of CBIS in the foreground are 
rich and varied. Some analysts narrowly define CBIS as tools to support specific 
information-processing tasks [l,3-6,10,l l,l4]. Other analysts focus on social and 
political impacts of CBIS implementation and use. Political analysts view CBIS as 
tools which bring power payoffs such as enhanced decision-making abilities or 
changes in the distribution of power and influence among different types of staff 
(15-20]. Marxists argue that managers use CBIS to increase their control over work 
processes and decrease worker control [2,21,22). These accounts assume that 
rational intentionality can substantially improve the performance of coalitions and 
organizational units. They also assume that organizational interest groups will be 
able to control the deployment of the technologies in their physical work settings 
and usually obtain the outcomes they intend [9]. 
Many empirical studies of actual outcomes of implementing CBIS into organiza-
tions show us that anticipated benefits do not materialize easily [13, 19,23-27]. In 
extreme cases, a CBIS which fails to meet the preferences of many users can fall into 
disuse [28,29). In other cases, CBIS are not used as they were intended by their 
designers (19). While implementation research has not found a single cause for suc-
cess or failure, analysts usually point to discrete organizational or technical elements 
as critical factors: inadequate management, lack of management support, user resist-
ance, or the sheer complexity of the CBIS [30). 
Managers and other participants in a computerization project can have substan-
tial trouble effectively controlling many aspects of a CBIS. implementation. One 
strategy for understanding the key difficulties of complex implementations is ro 
identify risk factors and undertake probabilistic assessments of success. A second 
strategy is to broaden the meaning of a CBIS implementation to include "the entire 
process of organizational change surrounding the introduction of a new information 
system" [30, p. 625). A third sirategy suggests that analysts employ an interaction 
perspective for understanding and planning successful implementations [ 19). The 
critical focus in these approaches is the interaction between the computerized system 
and its social/organizational setting: the better the fit between the system to be im-
plemented and the social context in which it will be embedded, the greater its 
chances of acceptance and use as originally intended. All of these strategies help 
focus attention on the social context in which systems' implementations take place. 
We have developed a set of models, web models, which examine the social context 
of the settings in which CBIS are adopted, developed, and used (26,27). Walsham et 
al. (31) characterize web models in these terms: 
"The basic tenet of web models [27) is that a computer system is best concep-
tualized as an ensemble of equipment, applications and techniques with iden-
tifiable information processing capabilities. Each computing resource has 
costs and skill requirements which are only partially identifiable,· in addition to 
its functional capabilities as an information processing tool it is a social object 
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which may be highly charged with meaning. There is no specially separable 
'human factor' for information systems: the development and routine opera-
tions of computer-based technologies hinge on many human judgements and 
actions, often influenced by political interests, structural constraints, and par~ 
ticipants' definition of their situations. 
The network of producers and consumers around the focal computing 
resource is termed the 'production lattice'; the interdependencies in this net-
work form the 'web' from which the model derives its name. The production 
lattice is a social organization which is itself embedded in a larger matrix of 
social and economic relations ('macrostructure') and is dependent upon a local 
infrastructure. According to web models, these macrostructures and local 
infrastructures direct the kind of computer-based service available at each 
node of the production lattice, and since they evolve over time computing 
developments are shaped by a set of historical commitments. In short, web 
models view information systems as 'complex social objects constrained by 
their context, infrastructure and history' [27)." 
Web analyses are action-oriented and examine the political interplay of coalitions 
in structured-but somewhat fluid-settings [26). The main organizing concepts 
were a 'focal computing technology' which was the center of analysis, the infrastruc-
ture which supported its development and operation (including production lattices), 
its context of development and use, and a history of organizational commitments 
which structured these arrangements. We did not have a clean way of separating 
social arrangements which comprised the computing milieu from other social 
arrangements in the relevant 'context.' In this paper we introduce a new concept, 
the social organization of computing, to help make that distinction clearer. We 
will indicate how some of the structuring of 'the social organization of computing' 
becomes specially rigid and institutionalized. The original formulation of web models 
treated resource dependencies as key explanatory elements. In contrast, institutional 
analyses hold that organizations may not change, even when they would improve 
their resources, power, etc. in response to shifting dependencies with other 
participants or their 'environment.' We do not abandon resource dependency ex-
planations, but we seek to expand the richness of web models by incorporating 
institutional analyses where appropriate. 
2. EXPLANATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE 
A guiding insight of 'organizational process' theories is that organizations are 
more 'productive' than loose coalitions and markets when they routinize many 
repeatable activities so as to produce (and reproduce) their basic services and pro-
ducts more easily (32). Routinization makes organizations predictable in the short 
run. Routinization can characterize any organizational unit, not just the core pro-
duction units. General Motors doesn't simply build cars with a variety of routinized 
practices: its approach to subcontracting for parts, setting up dealerships, organizing 
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ad campaigns, negotiating labor contracts, and opening factories overseas are likely 
to follow some standard guidelines, or 'standard operating procedures' (SOPs). 
SOPs may be formal rules and regulations, informal practices which people carry 
out for the many activities which are not subject to formal rules, and may even be 
the routine informal practices which people routinely carry out when they work 
around formal rules. 
The public policy literature points to SOPs as a critical element of organized social 
systems which acts as a constraining mechanism in bureaucratic organizations. 
SOPs act as obstacles to change when they are deeply embedded in an organization 
and difficult to control [33). Public policy analysts argue that when a new policy re-
quires change in an organization's SOPs there is less likelihood that it will be im-
plemented as its designers intended. One example is the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) whose staff saw it as a payments program and who were accustomed to 
evaluating individual claims. When Medicare became law, the SSA acquired new 
responsibilities for health care containment. Since SSA administrators had little in-
terest or expertise in the planning and budgeting of health care, they focused on 
denying claims in response to unnecessary or uncovered health care. The Senate 
Finance Committee criticized this practice and they took a more active role in con-
taining costs. But SSA administrators still emphasized those activities which closely 
fit their SOPs. 
We do not argue that SOPs do not change, or that organizations are locked in 
forever by their earliest commitments. Older organizations (and older subunits) 
change slowly except under special conditions. Radical increases or decreases of 
resources, substantially restructured arrangements for accountability and substan-
tial changes in staffing with people drawn from different social backgrounds or 
training can all lead to dramatic alterations of some organizational behaviors. These 
are extreme conditions. Many advocates of change programs such as managers, legi-
slators, consultants, regulators, and some academics, want organizations to change 
particular behaviors without magnificent new budgets or large infusions of new staff 
with a 'fresh view.' We argue that substantial changes under 'normal' conditions of 
relatively stable resources and staffing are often very difficult. 
Two major streams of information systems research focus processes that con-
strain CBIS implementations: the political action approach and the socio-technical 
design approach. The study of political dimensions in systems implementations 
examines distributions and possible redistributions of power and influence in 
organized social systems [15,19,25,34,35). The analyses explain why groups support 
or oppose specific computerization efforts in terms of perceived gains or losses of 
power. The socio-technical design approach examines the social processes of system 
design and conceptualizes computerization as both a social and a technical interven-
tion [36-39). The literature on socio-technical design identifies a participatory social 
process which would enable those who will use a new technology, i.e. the end-users, 
to influence its design. From this perspective, implementations fail when the 
preferences of end-users have not been taken into account in the design of a new 
system. 
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These two streams of research have made important contributions to our 
understanding of implementation processes. The political action analysts taught us 
how issues of power shaped the implementations of CBIS. The socio-technical 
analysts showed us how end-users often have critical working knowledge of key 
organizational practices which good CBIS should account for. However, these ap-
proaches cannot explain failed implementations when power shifts are not an issue. 
when the target group for the implementation had little power, or when end-user 
preferences have been taken into account in a participatory process. 
Individual political explanations of implementation failures are tautological when 
a failed implementation is the primary evidence of political conflict and resistance. 
Political action analyses usually ignore the structural features of organizations 
which can be slow to change or the intergroup dynamics of designing new systems. 
And they make it seem that powerful interest groups can force change rapidly when 
they gain power and can easily deter change when it would be detrimental. We want 
to retain a political focus on distributions of power within and between organiza-
tions because much organizational activity revolves around the interplay of groups 
vying for control, influence and resources. But we wish to avoid treating intentional-
rationality as the major explanation for implementation success and failure (9). 
Analyses of implementation failures from the socio-technical design approach 
present somewhat different dilemmas: 
( 1) they emphasize end-user participation prior to the implementation and ignore 
participation during the post-implementation phase of CBIS use [40); 
(2) they emphasize the social relations between system designers and end-users and 
exclude resource controllers and other powerful participants within the 
organization; 
(3) they focus on design choices implemented in software and ignore the social and 
technical choices implemented in computerized work environments [41); 
(4) they focus on normative prescriptions for participation because they are morally 
sound workplace practices rather than because they are empirically justified. 
We argue that conceptions of complex CBIS (i.e. those developed from complex, 
interdependent social and technical choices over time) should take into account the 
social structure of the ensemble of computing equipment and its supporting in-
frastructure. Some elements of the ensemble are tangible, like the physical distribu-
tion of equipment around an office. Other elements of the ensemble are intangible. 
One cannot 'see' the history of commitments that lead to present configurations 
or the ideologies which give meaning to current configurations and accessible 
alternatives. 
We argue that resistance to implementations can result from the 'inertia' of this 
social structure. We can better explain a wider range of implementation failures 
when we do not have to rely solely on the purposive rationality of organizational ac-
tors since many organizational participants are often unaware of specific system 
decisions, what outcomes will result from these decisions, and what actions they 
could take to effect the changes that they prefer. 
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In this paper we characterize complex. interdependent CBIS as having important 
'institutional' dimensions. At this point, we will briefly characterize 'institutions' as 
organized social arrangements which persist and are taken for granted by par-
ticipants, even when they do not work well and some powerful organizational actors 
seek to make substantial changes. The organized technical and social elements of a 
CBIS have important insticutional dimensions when they are not all fluid and easily 
subject to change by specific coalitions or interest groups. The inflexibility of some 
organized computing arrangements may impede those who desire large-scale 
changes. When routines become outmoded and no longer useful to the organization. 
many managers and users may push for large-scale changes in their computing 
arrangements. 
The organizational routines which facilitated efficient activities and stable en-
vironments in the past may prevent the changes which key participants may believe 
are critical to the organizations's continuing survival. We call this kind of organized 
rigidity 'institutional inflexibility.' Rather than focusing blame for failed implemen-
tations on resistent end-users or 'insensitive' system designers, the focus is on the 
social arrangements and practices which support the development and operation of 
the CBIS. 
3. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF COMPUTING 
We do not know all the factors that constitute a highly usable and stable CBIS en-
vironment. But we will report data from a case study which illustrates the difficulties 
one organization's members faced when confronted with an important CBIS con-
version project. 1 Neither the political action approach nor the socio-technical design 
approach alone could effectively explain the failure since end-users had participated 
in the decision making and the project was supported by powerful actors in the 
organization. We found that the ways in which key social and technical elements 
were organized and structured impeded the conversion project. 
We conceptualize some of these elements as the 'social organization of com-
puting.' We define social organization of computing as the patterned organization 
of a mix of computing technologies and social arrangements to support them across 
organizational units, space, and time. This abstract conception can be made con-
crete by identifying the different organizational units and participants who interact 
with a given CBIS or kind of computing technology (e.g. spreadsheets on microcom-
puters). One identifies: 
1. equipment configurations-the locations of different kinds of equipment 
(including software) in different organizational units and physical locations; 
2. skills and roles-participants' skills and the different roles that the groups play in 
providing data, using data, etc.; 
3. infrastructure-the support groups and their skills, and the conditions under 
which their services are accessible to the participants who use the computing 
technology (e.g. pricing policies, restrictions on access to equipment); 
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4. important spatial and temporal variations in the organization of computing 
equipment and infrastructure. 
'Social maps' like these organized lists indicate how a computing technology is 
socially organized in a particular setting. They combine both tangible elements, such 
as the distribution of equipment, and intangible elements, such as skill mixes and 
patterns of administrative control. Since the actual capabilities of computing 
technologies to deliver usable information depend upon associated skills, resources, 
and adjunct equipment. the social map helps indicate which capabilities are acces-
sible to whom, and when. Because it includes some intangible elements, one cannot 
create such a map by a simple visual inspection. One must learn about the politics 
and work practices of the organization through other modes of social inquiry, such 
as interviewing, conversation, written documents, etc. 
Computer users usually experience the social organization of computing as part of 
the social practices in their everyday work world. For example, students who use a 
university's computer center during daytime weekday hours when consultants and 
teaching assistants are available often have much more help, but use more congested 
facilities than students in the same courses who use the same facilities after mid-
night. The social organization of their computing environments changes between the 
day and night. Similarly, students who carry out computer work at home on their 
own micros face a different world of support and time pressure than do students in 
the same course who use similar equipment in labs where teaching assistants can help 
students during tightly scheduled 90 minute sessions. In this second example, the 
location of equipment and assistance and administrative control patterns are key 
features in the social organization of computing. These two highly simplified ex-
amples suggest how the social organization of computing influences the ways that 
people work and the kind of work that they can do, even when their computing 
equipment is effectively identical. · 
The social maps portray a 'static snapshot' of the social organization of computing 
in a particular setting. The social organization of computing changes over time in 
most settings which we have studied as well as our own university workplaces. It has 
a dynamic quality which these social maps do not readily communicate. New equip-
ment may be introduced for specialized purposes, and only some staff trained in its 
use. This may lead to some facilities being highly congested while other facilities 
have slack capacity. Or some groups may computerize a larger fraction of their ad-
ministrative records over time, and slowly change the job of their group secretary 
from a receptionist/typist into a sophisticated computer user. 
The static configurations of equipment, skills, support resources, etc. have often 
been built up slowly over time to m~ many different organizational preferences, 
which are not tightly coordinated. To amplify our last example: the salary scales and 
job descriptions of many organizations have not yet taken account of the ways 
in which many professionals and managers have restructured secretarial jobs to re-
quire substantial computer skills. Managers and professionals usually computerize 
with the staff they supervise and rarely attempt to alter personnel classifications 
and salary scales simultaneously. Similarly, managers who committed their 
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organizations as Hewlett-Packard shops or IBM shops by the 1970s could not have 
anticipated that their staffs would be using specific proprietary applications with 
peculiar quirks later on, such as PROFS or HP-Desk (their respective 'office' 
packages) for electronic mail in the 1980s. The social organization of computing one 
finds today in a particular setting is the product of choices which had many conse-
quences that were not foreseen by key participants when they were first made. This 
is no surprise, since no one has perfect foresight. However, the social analyst of 
computing cannot ignore the way that earlier commitments persist and are taken for 
granted even when they are no longer effective. 
The social organization of computing which surrounds a complex CBIS is very 
difficult to characterize concisely. Even the static social maps that we have described 
above can become quite large and unwieldy. The 'map' of the social organization of 
computing in a particular setting portrays a particular configuration of equipment, 
resources, practices, and control patterns. These configurations have important 
historical and dynamic dimensions, as well as the static components and relation-
ships we have discussed above. In an earlier formulation, we segmented these static 
and dynamic dimensions into three major categories: social, political and historical 
[42]. This factoring is both useful and artificial. Political processes allocate 
resources, such as money and people, but also social values, such as status and 
legitimacy. Political processes are social; but we identified them as a separate 
category because some social analysts of computing focus on cooperative group 
relationships and ignore intragroup and intergroup politics. We also identified an 
explicit 'historical' dimension because many analyses of computerization discount 
the way that the social organization of computing in support of a CBIS develops 
over time in ways that can shape its future, as well as its present. However 
'historical' has meaning in describing the long-term development of the technical 
configurations of equipment, the social organization of computing, and the politics 
of computing in a particular setting. 'Historical' is not an independent and parallel 
category. Because of these dilemmas, we have abandoned this simple tripartite fac-
toring. We will occasionally discuss the 'political' or 'historical' characteristics of a 
computing configuration primarily as a way to focus attention. 
The computing configurations that develop in any given work setting are not 
purely instrumental or motivated by exclusively efficiency concerns. Each con-
figuration has social and political meanings for CBIS users. Status differences bet-
ween professionals and clerks may be reflected in the quality of the workstations in 
their offices. Practices that give managers newer or larger capacity work stations in 
private offices while clerical workers share older machines in open bull-pens are 
rooted more in traditional social practices than in conscious efforts to maximize pro-
ductivity or efficiency. 
In the next section, we will characterize the social organization of computing 
where it is highly institutionalized. This paper examines how attention to the institu-
tional aspects of the social organization of computing sheds light on the develop-
ments of a CBIS in one rich case study. This paper raises also many questions 
which merit future investigation. 
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4. CBIS AS SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Top managers and other participants cannot rapidly reorganize and improve 
CBIS which are troublesome. From a rational perspective, such difficulties should 
be surprising since 'skill and will' should be sufficient to effect social change. But 
larger scale CBIS have important institutional dimensions which limit the abilities of 
key actors to transform rapidly some of the abstract information-processing 
capabilities of CBIS into concrete systems which serve their interests. The develop-
ment of specialized computing arrangements facilitates many routine behaviors but 
constrains very novel behaviors. This specialization and routinization stabilizes social 
arrangements, but also impedes organizational actors who seek large-scale changes. 
The SSA payments system illustrates institutional inflexibility. It produces about 
40 million checks per month and was developed in the 1950s in Autocoder; it re-
mained relatively intact through the early 1980s. The SSA has tried to overhaul the 
payments system at least three times in the last 15 years without success, although a 
new Systems Modernization Plan that may be completed in the 1990s is in progress 
(30]. Even though some new laws have been passed during the late 1970s (e.g. 
eligibility requirements) which change the way in which payments are legally 
distributed, none of these laws had actually been implemented in software for at 
least five years.' We do not have adequately detailed accounts of the earlier efforts 
to change the SSA's payments systems to understand where the difficulties lay. But 
the persistence of the SSA's outdated payments system architecture from the 1950s 
indicates that large scale CBIS can be exceptionally difficult to replace. 3 
Characterizing CB1S as institutions is important for several reasons: 
(I) CBIS vary from one social setting to another (even when they are identical 'off 
the shelf' systems) owing to the variety of ways in which social organizations of 
computing emerge in different settings; 
(2) the actual usability of CBIS in specific social settings is the critical factor in 
assessing social benefits, not the potential capabilities of the technology as it 
may be used by special individuals; 
(3) CBIS that are well-used and have stable social structures for supporting and 
using them will be much more difficult to change or replace than those with less 
associated social structure and fewer participants. 
When analysts emphasize the social and political choices that organizational 
actors have made over time, they are placing its institutional character in the 
foreground. Many of these institutional dimensions are intangible and taken for 
granted. Long after some interest groups have lost power or influence in the 
organization, their interests and visions may still be embedded commitments to 
equipment, SOPs and organizational arrangements. 
Institutionalization theory extends back to Selznick's treatment of organizations 
as institutions (43). He distinguished between a rational means-oriented organiza-
tion and a value-laden institution. Organizations were dispensable once specific 
goals were fulfilled while institutions strived for permanence. Perrow (44) built 
upon this distinction by elaborating on the important interactions between an 
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organization and its environment. Organizations became institutions as they became 
valued in and of themselves: their disappearance would cause serious problems for 
participants beyond rational goals or functions. An institution holds social meaning 
beyond mere instrumentality. 
Meyer and Rowan• view institutionalization as a variable. The degree of institu-
tionalization determines the extent to which actions are part of comparatively stable 
structures or emergent structures. They define institutionalization as " ... the pro-
cesses by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rulelike 
status in social thought and action." 
Laudon (45, p. 732) proposed an institutional model of system development. He 
characterized institutions as "a set of widely shared values and interests pertaining 
to areas of strategic and social importance. These values and interests are served by 
specific organizations through the allocation of statuses and roles, and they are in-
ternalized by individuals through lengthy socialization carried out by organizations." 
He went on to characterize institutional models as those which "explain organiza-
tional behavior in terms of internalized values, interests, and structures." For 
Laudon, values which most participants in a social system take for granted, such as 
'professional management' in Federal agencies; are institutionalized and can in-
fluence the adoption and development of CBIS. 
All conceptions of the term 'institution' share a focus on social practices which 
persist, even when they are not very workable, efficient, or effective. Our concep-
tion of 'institutionalized behaviors' is much more varied than Laudon's, since key 
values and structures can become 'rulelike' in small social units, like the depart-
ments of an organization. For example, accounting departments are much more 
likely to value accurate data, while production departments in manufacturing are 
more likely to value meeting quotas by regular shipping dates. Moreover, we focus 
more on SOPs than on values, even though we believe that values can shape action 
under special circumstances. 
According to Scott [46), institutional theory is in its adolescence.~ He identifies 
four major varieties of institutional theories that have influenced sociological in-
vestigations. In this paper we are not trying to support definitively our own 
approach to institutionalization against alternative approaches. Rather we are in-
terested in illustrating how a focus on institutionalized practices and structures sheds 
light on CBIS implementations that fail. In the PRINTCO case that we describe 
below, we will examine some of the tangible and intangible dimensions of a social 
organization of computing that is highly institutionalized. Before we turn to the case 
in detail, it is worth examining how the social organization of computing develops 
institutional features. 
4.1. Technical configurations 
Technology can play a critical role in computerized work settings. The manipula-
tion of information may alter the ways in which work is accomplished and the social 
relations in the work setting. Moreover, some problems of work can be reduced or 
., 
' 
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even eliminated through improved technologies. But technologies are still only one 
element in the web of computing (27) and the overall organization of .,.·ork. Some 
problems of productivity cannot necessarily be resolved through the continual ac-
quisition of advanced technologies. Overall productivity also hinges on the skills of 
workers, their products, market conditions, etc. It is an open empirical question 
whether highly computerized work settings (e.g. where most people have multifunc-
tional work stations, networks, and leading edge software) are more productive or 
more competitive than their less computerized counterpans. For example, text pro-
cessors can help newspaper reporters write stories and organize notes; but computers 
don't have a 'nose for news' or the ability to meet and interview key informants. 
Special computerized contact lists can help salesmen locate likely prospects and 
know something about their preferences. They can help provide compelling cost 
data but they can't automatically build trust and convince a reluctant customer or 
close a sale. 
From an institutional perspective the ways in which work is organized across work 
groups in an organization influences the SOPs of participant groups. Different user 
groups often share some interdependent work schedules and routines. In manufac-
turing work environments, products are shipped as the result of the collective ac-
tivities of many diverse departments and divisions. The interdependence of work 
routines implies that the contribution of some component, policy, or practice hinges 
on its dependency upon other components, policies and work-group practices. For 
example, when a fast machine replaces a much slower machine, one expects speedier 
production. However, increased demand on the new machine may result in some 
groups of users waiting in line for access [48]. Their lost waiting time may exceed the 
gains of speedier technology. Further, when the speedier equipment does expand 
productivity in one work group, it can lead to log-jams elsewhere. Thus, im-
provements in some components of an ensemble of computing technologies do not 
necessarily improve overall performance. 
4.2. The politics of the developmental trajectory 
The development and use of CBIS are not without conflict. Analysts who push the 
theme that computing fosters cooperation and rationality gloss over deep social and 
value conflicts that social change due to computerization may precipitate [49,50). In 
practice, organizational participants can have major battles about what kind of 
computing equipment to acquire, how to organize access to it, and the standards to 
regulate its use [27,40,51). 
When CBIS are characterized as institutions, organizational politics play an im-
portant role. Powerful groups can attempt to influence the developments of a CBIS 
even when they cannot control the outcomes they desire [40). Data Processing (DP) 
departments specialize their work over time as they routinely fulfill the computing 
preferences of particular groups over the preferences of other groups. They are likely 
to hire new staff who primarily share their world views-in pref erring particular 
application domains (e.g. finance), languages (e.g. COBOL), equipment vendors 
(e.g. IBM), etc. However, specialization and routinization reduce the ability of DP 
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departments to engage in work activities which depart from their skills and SOPs at 
a later time. Consequently, an engineering department which seeks computing sup-
port for computational programs written in Pascal or C which run under Unix on a 
DEC-Vax will usually find systemic difficulties in obtaining meaningful service from 
a DP shop which develops financial applications on large IBM 308x mainframes 
under VM in COBOL. (The reverse is also likely-that finance staff would have dif-
ficulty in obtaining high quality data processing sen·ice from an engineering 
oriented computing staff who prefer different kinds of applications, programming 
languages, and machines.) 
Institutions develop a character based on the interests they have served in the past, 
and the world-views which bind their participants together. Incremental changes in 
computing arrangements usually improve the fit between the system and its 
organization, decreasing the probability that powerful actors could easily replace it. 
Participants organize their work lives around the belief that activities which have 
become routinized will persist. They come to depend on existing social and technical 
arrangements for working and for achieving personal goals. For these users, and for 
other important actors in the organization, the particular social organization of a 
CBIS can become indispensable. 
4.3. History of organizational practices 
Individuals are constrained in using CBIS as they prefer by a variety of organiza-
tional practices, within their own work groups or to help coordinate their work with 
others. Even when the social context of use appears at first glance relatively simple, 
other agencies may require compliance to their demands or negotiation with peers. 
Issues of social order, power, and social control emerge where more than one person 
is interested in the resource and its potential benefits. Having access to equipment or 
the use of certain systems may have symbolic as well as instrumental value (25]. 
Institutional analyses emphasize the social use of CBIS and social control over the 
computing arrangements. When work groups share an information processing 
resource, such as a CBIS, the resource managers are likely to have negotiated par-
ticular arrangements with different groups at different times. These arrangements 
cross-constrain shared resources. Over time, large changes become potentially more 
costly and difficult, since commitments in the past may limit the range of future con-
figurations. 
Below, we present a case study in which key actors in one organization attempt a 
conversion process that was favored by end-users and supported by top manage-
ment. When we last visited the organization in 1984, four years after the beginning 
of the conversion, they still had not been successful. 
5. THE CASE OF PRINTCO 
We present summary case data from one manufacturing organization, PRINTCO, 
to illustrate the importance of an institutional conception of the social organization 
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of computing.6 Our data from PRINTCO are based on 44 detailed interviews which 
we conducted over an 18-month period with 40 respondents in a variety of roles, 
departments and levels of authority. All of our respondents were either users or 
resource controllers of the Material Requirements Planning (MRP) system, the core 
module of the manufacturing division's inventory control system. 
PRINTCO is a medium-sized manufacturing firm (about 800 employees) which 
designs, makes and markets several lines of medium-speed dot matrix line printers 
for the mini-computer and small business computer marketplace. The firm has posi-
tioned itself as a low-cost producer in a highly competitive market. PRINTCO 
began shipping printers in 1975 and maintained a fairly constant demand of 12 000-
15 000 printers a year during the late 1970s despite market fluctuations. During the 
1980s the firm grew rapidly to become a major producer of dot matrix line printers. 
In 1977 key actors adopted and began operating a simple MRP system which they 
purchased from a nearby manufacturing firm. They wanted better control over their 
investments in purchased parts. They wanted the parts to be on hand when needed 
but not sitting in inventory many months in advance so that costly inventory would 
build up. The MRP system helped the material control staff reduce inventory costs 
(and increase inventory 'turns'). 
In the late 1970s PRINTCO grew by diversifying the variety of printers produced. 
They started new product lines, and also increased the variety of ways in which they 
customized printers for special orders. The new products complicated the logistics of 
managing inventory. The material control managers began looking for more 
sophisticated MRP software to help resolve manufacturing logistics problems, like 
capacity planning, tracking multiple simultaneous revisions of products, and 
accounting for planned orders. An informal committee found an MRP package that 
satisfied their preferences. But it ran on a Data General minicomputer, a DG S350 
Eclipse, rather than on their IBM System 34. So they purchased a DG Eclipse. 
The conversion began in 1980 and the DP staff believed that it would take one 
year. After 18 months, staff had not completed the conversion. Unexpected problems 
plagued the project. The computer vendor (Data General) provided PRINTCO with 
telephone support, but little assistance on site. The DP manager had problems hiring 
more programmers with the necessary skills to work on the conversion. Many of the 
original systems, including the MRP system, were not well documented and infor-
mation gaps further complicated the conversion project. Some of the programmers 
who had patched the MRP system over the years had left the company. The current 
DP staff feared making large scale changes because they were unsure about how 
some of the modules interacted. 
MRP users around the firm complained about DP because they had waited a long 
time for a payoff. The DP staff's morale was low. They had invested tremendous 
effort and resources, but no longer believed they could convert to the new MRP 
system. The senior vice president of manufacturing saw an impending crisis. He 
formed a data-processing steering committee to guide and direct the DP manager. 
The steering committee gave the DP manager specific schedules, but he failed to 
meet them. 
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The steering committee hired a new DP manager after a six-month search in which 
they found few acceptable candidates. His technical background was weak, but his 
managerial skills were stronger. He promptly ended the conversion project. 
Members of the steering committee had become resigned to sell the hardware and 
lose their investment in the software. The new DP manager and the committee 
decided to continue working with their existing IBM System 34, enhancing the MRP 
system as best they could and possibly leasing another System 34, if necessary. DP 
upgraded the existing disk and added memory. Additional ports enabled 13 people 
to log on simultaneously. The new DP manager established short-term and long-
term priorities for departmental work at the steering committee's direction. In addi-
tion, the committee required and approved written user requests for new program-
ming tasks. 
Unfortunately, the new DP manager did not follow the direction of the steering 
committee and tried to mobilize support for purchasing a more sophisticated com-
puter (an IBM System 38). The steering committee saw little progress on the 
enhancements of their MRP system. After 10 months, the steering committee fired 
the new DP manager. 
Because of the long and arduous work invested in hiring the prior DP manager, 
the steering committee decided not to search outside the firm for a third DP 
manager. Instead they promoted the manager of engineering services to the role of 
Operations Director, a new title for the DP manager. Almost immediately, they 
decided to buy an IBM 4331' and found new MRP software to satisfy their 
preferences. They started a new conversion project. The preferences of manufactur-
ing staff mobilized the original conversion effort. DP staff avoided requests from 
other user departments during this time. Staff in other departments began searching 
for other ways to satisfy their computing needs. 
Several departments obtained DEC LSI-11 micro-computers from test equipment 
cast off by other departments. They upgraded them into usable computing equip-
ment with the help of their own skilled staff. Other departments requested and 
received new LSI-11 micros. Because of problems in DP, no one had paid much 
attention to the proliferation of micro-computing. Soon six to ten LSI-11 's were 
scattered around the firm. One staff member in the test equipment area became the 
informal 'expert' in operating, programming and using the micro-computers. 
PRINTCO had hired consultants and new programmers to help in the conver-
sion to MRP II on the IBM 4331. DP staff began working on other projects so that 
other users would stop complaining. DP had become a larger more successful 
organization. 
6. AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PRINTCO'S MRP 
CONVERSION FAILURE 
We have identified several major problems in PRINTCO's failure to convert from 
their original MRP system to a more sophisticated system. These problems are the 
product of key actors foregrounding the potential information processing benefits 
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of the new technologies to the extent that they ignored the social organization of 
their current computing environment. They were not simply replacing one \-IRP 
system for another, they were also attempting to replace the existing social organiza-
tion of computing in their firm with an altered configuration. Although their com-
puting environment was small and somewhat informal, it was usahle and stable, i.e. 
it was highly organized in very specific ways. 
How can we characterize the social organization of computing at PRINTCO 
when they first began their conversion? We have selected some episodes to illustrate 
how intangible dimensions of the social organization of computing can be highly 
organized and constrain substantial change. None of these issues were taken into 
consideration prior to the conversion project. It is only through our analysis of the 
case that we could extract some explanation for the continuing failure of the conver-
sion project at PRINTCO. 
6.1. Specialization 
The most powerful organizational actors were located in manufacturing and 
finance. As a result, they controlled the direction of data processing at PRINTCO 
and were their best-served customers. 
Since the implementation of the original MRP system, the data-processing depart-
ment had become specialized in altering reports from existing systems written in 
RPG-II. The DP staff became skilled in producing the routine MRP repons for 
manufacturing and occasional reports for finance. The programmers were demand 
driven and spent their time responding to constant requests for major and minor 
enhancements. These enhancements were relatively simple, concrete, predictable, 
and generated immediate results, compared with converting the MRP system. 
Programming support and computing operations became specialized around these 
services running a small set of CBIS and making minor enhancements. The existing 
MRP was custom tailored to PRINTCO's manufacturing operations. 
6.2. Work prioritization schemes of support staff 
The first DP manager had served as a one-man DP shop during PRINTCO's 
earliest days. He spent most of his energy programming even after he added several 
more staff. Over the years, he never fully accepted the role of manager. He preferred 
to spend his time as a programmer/analyst rather than manage his staff. As a result, 
the staff were left to set up their own work priorities. And because of his early in-
dependent stature, none of the Vice Presidents ever made him accountable to any 
formal schedule. 
Requests came into DP informally. The ordering of projects and distribution of 
programming time often depended on informal contacts between programmers and 
users. Short-term, routine projects received the most attention from staff and long-
term, non-routine projects received little attention or effort. The conversion from 
the original MRP to a more sophisticated one was a novel effort which did not fit the 
routine established work patterns of this small DP shop. Staff could easily keep 
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themselves busy with their routine work and put off the more difficult conversion 
work. 
The programmers and end-users worked together in very simple face-to-face 
negotiating contexts. Programmers would comply with these requests on a first-
come first-served basis with no planning or prioritization schemes other than what 
the programmer felt s/he could do first. 
After the DP manager was replaced, the new manager instituted some prioritiza-
tion schemes for ordering programming work based on the decisions of the members 
of the newly formed steering committee. The manager gave work to the program-
mers according to their skill and availability, not according to their informal ties or 
rapport with end-users. It was hoped that these changes could move the DP depart-
ment from a simple operation to one that could handle more complex work tasks 
and larger more novel projects. 
6.3. Skills of computing staff 
PRINTCO's programmers had learned to write and modify simple RPG-II pro-
grams on the job. The new software was technically more sophisticated than the old 
MRP software and was written in a different language, BASIC. Since the new soft-
ware would not run on the IBM System 34 minicomputer, manufacturing managers 
decided also to purchase a new Data General minicomputer. However, none of the 
programmers had ever used BASIC or the operating system of the new minicom-
puter. They attended several BASIC programming classes but their learning curve 
was slow. Key actors tried to hire people who could program in both BASIC and 
RPG-II to expedite the conversion. However, they could not locate and hire new 
programmers with programming skills in both languages. 
PRINTCO's managers purchased the new MRP software from an outside vendor 
because none of the current DP staff had appropriate software development skills to 
develop a newer more adequate MRP system. Substantial development skills had 
been unnecessary in the past since the programmers had worked only on maintaining 
their present CBIS, the MRP system and some finance systems. And they had never 
before attempted to hire new staff with specific software development skills. 
PRINTCO's managers presumed that their DP staff had all the skills necessary for 
most computing tasks or could easily acquire them. They had not realized that the 
skills and work routines of the department were very specialized and limited. 
6.4. Laissez faire attitudes 
Key actors at PRINTCO had developed a laissez faire attitude toward DP staff 
and the resources they might need to develop an adequate social organization of 
computing for the conversion. Once funds were allocated for purchasing equipment, 
the more powerful actors ignored the tempo development for over a year. The 
original DP manager had never been a powerful organizational actor who could 
fight for the resources he might have needed to complete his project on schedule. It 
was only after the project foundered that some of the key managers tried to control 
Computerized information systems 23 
DP more tightly through the steering committee and hiring a new DP manager. The 
steering committee was a new approach, and actually was a break with prior SOPs in 
giving the DP department substantial autonomy. 
6.5. Control over new developments 
Before starting the conversion project, key manufacturing staff members focused 
on equipment decisions and negotiating the purchase. They based their decisions on 
the preferences of users in manufacturing who wanted a sophisticated on-line ~RP 
system. The informal selection committee invested time and energy into selecting 
equipment. Once the equipment was purchased, they returned to their own routine 
work. After a year had gone by, some managers started asking critical questions 
about the conversion. 
They discovered that there were more problems than progress. The conversion 
effort was expensive and showed no results. The laissez faire attitude of upper 
managers toward DP had not proved successful. Key actors who had originally 
thought of their new MRP system as a tool for manufacturing staff attempted to 
gain control over many aspects of the computing environment. They formalized 
their own membership in a steering committee [52). Within the framework of the 
committee, they finally began to focus on changes in the social organization of com-
puting that might enhance and support the conversion. 
6.6. The microcomputer revolution 
Other staff in the organization, especially staff in test-engineering, had to develop 
their own computing environments. Many of these staff had the skills to develop an 
adequate infrastructure of support for their own work groups even though they had 
very little money to spend on equipment. They were effectively cut out of discus-
sions about the conversion project both at the early stages and later when the steer-
ing committee was organized. Consequently the firm never took advantage of the 
skills and expertise that had developed around computing in the engineering depart-
ments. 
Staff in engineering sought their own microcomputers. These staff viewed their 
micros as tools which helped them develop small scale CBIS independently of the in-
effective DP shop. The micro-revolution lasted a year, before control over com-
puting equipment and programming was recentralized under DP. 
During the conversion project, two parallel computing environments were 
developing independent of each other. Each required investments of time and 
money from the organization. Each was left to run its course with little direction and 
modest resources. 
7. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES OF CBIS 
The social organization of computing which supports key CBIS is highly institu-
tionalized in most complex organizations. The use and control of the CBIS are 
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shared among interest groups with different preferences, stakes, and historical com-
mitments. The institutional dimensions of computing add complexity and inertia 
which make changes in technology slower and more costly than many participants 
would wish. 
At PRINTCO, key actors made the decision to purchase a new MRP system based 
on its technical capabilities and potential benefits to users in the manufacturing divi-
sion. Their computing environment had many organized work practices, com-
mitments, specializations and routines which they did not take into account when 
they made the decision. Routine work specializes the social organization of com-
puting. Staff at PRINTCO specialized in producing repons from existing systems in 
RPG-II. 
They performed these activities well. A combination of specific skill levels, the 
organization of their work prioritization schemes, and commitments to certain users 
in manufacturing led to computing arrangements which supported their routine 
work but did not support software development. Their commitments to uncommon 
combinations of technologies (MRP written in RPG-II and BASIC) made it difficult 
for them to hire programmers with new development skills. 
Staff stabilize and routinize their work environments and create highly organized 
computing milieus in the process. The case of PRINTCO illustrates an important 
paradox: a useful and stable CBIS can be problematic when key organizational 
actors try to change it in adapting to new conditions. Even when CBIS are fairly 
primitive and social relations are informal, as it was at PRINTCO at the time of the 
conversion, elements of the computing environment had become highly organized 
and taken for granted. Critical social dimensions that could have been taken into 
account by organizational actors include: the skills and work expectations of com-
puting staff; the work prioritization schemes that had developed between computer 
staff and end-users; who controls new developments in the computing environment 
and the deployment of resources; organizational practices about training users and 
computer staff; the degree of specialization in terms of computing software and 
hardware; and past commitments to the specific work groups which effectively ex-
clude other groups from decision making. 
We argue that computing arrangements that are highly institutionalized will arise 
wherever there are shared control and interest groups vying for the resources of a 
CBIS. An institutional analysis is critical for understanding how CBIS are likely to 
be used in more complex work settings where constraints and limitations are part of 
the everyday work world. It is a paradox that the more stable and usable a current 
social organization of computing is, the more difficult it will be to make substantial 
changes. This does not mean that implementations of new CBIS are impossible. 
Rather, the social organization of computing must be taken into account prior to the 
setting of realistic expectations of performance and schedules. In practice, we 
observe that new generations of CBIS and other replacement computer technologies 
are often implemented and effectively used on a much slower time scale than many 
key participants expect. 
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It is ironic that we invoke institutional analyses to understand computerization in 
action. The images of computerization-new technologies, innovative practices. and 
a patina of 'revolution' -are diametrically opposed to the stodgy images of institu-
tionalization. The rhetorics of innovation, transformation and revolution emphasize 
possibilities. These rhetorics deny that historical patterns will continue to shape the 
future. In fact, computerization has not transformed many organizations as rapidly 
as some advocates hoped. We argue that innovation need not fail only because of 
powerful organized resistance. A history of complex social and technical com-
mitments may structure the social organization of computing to make innovation 
relatively expensive and complex. 
Institutionalization has many ironies. Innovators like to see their innovations 
widely adopted for indefinite periods. Moreover, there are many economies of scale 
when innovations are institutionalized [53). But the technologies and innovative 
practices of one era have often acted as a brake on subsequent innovation. For ex-
ample, once an organization develops technical standards, they often remain in 
place for decades, despite the availability of technically better alternatives. COBOL 
is still a mainstay business programming language after 30 years, despite the wide 
availability of fourth generation database languages. MS-DOS and IBM-PC com-
patible micros remain the business standard, despite the availability of Maclntoshs 
with easier to learn interfaces and IBM's promotion of a more complex OS/2 
operating system. In cases like these, the immense installed base of earlier 
technologies means that substantial conversions are also very costly, in changing 
equipment, skills, visions of 'appropriate computerization,' and organizational 
practices. We would be surprised to see COBOL and MS-DOS comparably entren-
ched in 30 years, since organizations do shift their technical commitments. 
Similarly, the social organization of computing in organizations does shift over 
time. The widespread use of microcomputers has moved the locus of control on 
some systems from central information systems departments to end users. These 
shifts of control are coupled with shifting ideologies about what computers are good 
for and how computerization projects should develop. But again, such changes are 
relatively slow in many organizations. Good social theories of computerization have 
to come to terms with the social processes of change and of stasis. We hope that this 
paper stimulates further empirical and theoretical research along these lines. 
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NOTES 
1 We have published some aspects of this case study of the development of a material re-
quirements planning system in a medium-sized manufacturing firm, PRINTCO, in ~era! 
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prior publications [26,40). This anicle is not primarily about PRINTCO; rather we use the 
case of PRINTCO to illustrate some of our key concepts and arguments. 
2 Walter Doughtery of IBM, Yorktown Heights, reponed this situation in a lecture to the 
Department of Information and Computer Science, University of California, Irvine, October 
27, 1983. Also see The Social Security Administration and In formation Technology - Special 
Report OT A-CIT-31 I. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC, October 1986. 
3 Like the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) still relied upon systems designed in the 1950s for 
their operations in the early I 980s. However the IRS seems to have modernized (and decen-
tralized) some of their major information systems in the mid-l 980s. The contrast between the 
IRS and the SSA suggests that large organizations are not necessarily locked into an unchang-
ing iron cage by their computerized information systems. We suspect that IRS's role as a major 
collector of revenue for the Federal government in contrast with the SSA's payments system as 
a payout system may have made some difference in the willingness of Congress and top ad-
ministrators to fund major system changes. This resource dependency argument is specula-
tive. But it suggests that both resource dependency and institutional explanations may have 
important roles in explaining the success/failure of CBIS implementations under different 
conditions. 
4 J. Mayer and B. Rowan, Institutional organizations: formal structures as myth and 
ceremony. Am. J. Socio!., 83 (1977) 340-363. 
5 Institutionalization theory-which examines social stability-is, ironically, still develop-
ing and dynamic. See Zucker (47] as well as Scott (46] for accounts of recent developments. 
6 For a chronology of system developments at PRINTCO, please refer to [40]. 
7 The IBM 4331 was larger than the System 38 which the steering committee rejected. And 
it was a potential platform for a substantially more sophisticated computing environment. 
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